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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

:
:

v.

:

TONJA RYNHART,

:

Defendant/Petitioner.

Case No. 20020760-CA

:
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION

This is an appeal from a interlocutory order denying suppression of evidence in a
prosecution for possession of cocaine and paraphernalia. This Court has jurisdiction of
the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (2002).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the warrantless search of a purse found lying on thefloorof a
wrecked and unlocked minivan for evidence of the missing driver's identification
was justified under the emergency aid doctrine?
"[The appellate court] review[s] the factual findings underlying the trial court's
denial of [a] defendant's motion to suppress under a clearly erroneous standard." State v.
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 8, 994 P.3d 1283. "[The appellate court] will determine
there was clear error 'only if the factual findings made by the trial court are not
adequately supported by the record.'" Id. (quoting State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,
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1232 (Utah 1996)). "By contrast, [the appellate court] review[s] 'the trial court's
conclusions of law based on such facts under a correctness standard, according no
deference to the trial court's legal conclusions."' Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. CONST. Amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-32 (1998 & Supp. 2002):

(1) (a) The operator of a vehicle that collides with or is involved in an
accident with any vehicle or other property that is unattended and that
results in damage to the other vehicle or property shall immediately stop
and shall:
(i) locate and notify the operator or owner of the vehicle or the
owner of other property of the operator's name and address and the
registration number of the vehicle causing the damage; or
(ii) attach securely in a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other
property a written notice giving the operator's name and address and the
registration number of the vehicle causing the damage.
(2) A person who violates Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor.
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 41-6-116.10 (1998 & Supp. 2002):

(1) As used in this section, "abandoned vehicle" means a vehicle that is left
unattended:
(a) on a highway for a period in excess of 48 hours; or
(b) on any public or private property for a period in excess of seven
days without express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful
possession or control of the property.
(2) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any highway.
2
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(3) A person may not abandon a vehicle upon any public or private property
without the express or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful possession
or control of the property.
(4) A peace officer who has reasonable grounds to believe that a vehicle has
been abandoned may remove the vehicle or cause it to be removed in
accordance with Section 41-6-102.5.
(5) If the motor number, manufacturer's number or identification mark of
the abandoned vehicle has been defaced, altered or obliterated, the vehicle
may not be released or sold until the original motor number, manufacturer's
number of identification mark has been replaced, or until a new number
assigned by the Motor Vehicle Division has been stamped on the vehicle.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of cocaine, enhanced to a second degree
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(b)(ii), (4)(a) (1999 & Supp. 2002),
and possession of paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 58-37a-5 (1999). Following a preliminary hearing on 29 May 2002, defendant was
bound over for trial (R15; R72:15). Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence seized
pursuant to a warrantless search of her purse after it was found inside a wrecked mini van
on another's private property (R24-27). The same judge who conducted the preliminary
hearing conducted the evidentiary hearing on defendant's motion to suppress (R72-73)
(complete copies of the preliminary hearing and suppression hearing transcripts are
attached in addendums A and B9 respectively). Because the judge was familiar with the
evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, which was essentially undisputed, the
suppression hearing was abbreviated (see R73), add. B. The trial court denied the motion
(R44-48) (a copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached in addendum Q. Defendant

3
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successfully petitioned the Court for interlocutory review (See Order, dated 5 November
2002).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At about 8:30 a.m., on 6 January 2002, Officer Bumham of the Brigham City
Police Department was on patrol when he received a dispatch report of an abandoned or
wrecked vehicle (R72:2-3), add. A. Upon arriving at the scene of the wreck, Officer
Bumham observed a minivan "out in the middle of a swamp" (R72:3), add, A. The
minivan appeared to have "traveled over the curb, down an embankment," and "through
two fences" before coming to rest "out in the marsh" (id.). Because it had snowed at
approximately 3:00 a.m., and because the tire tracks were snow covered, Officer
Burnham surmised the wreck occurred several hours earlier, sometime prior to 3:00 a.m.
(R72:4), add. A.
Officer Burnham opened an unlocked door in order to look for identification and
to determine "if anybody was in the vehicle at all" (R72:4-5), add. A (see also R73:10),
add. B. No one was inside the minivan, but he found a briefcase on thefrontpassenger
seat and a purse on the floor (id.). Officer Bumham looked through the purse and found a
driver's license belonging to defendant (id.). The purse also contained $329 cash, "a
couple of gift certificates to Smith's and a small bag that had a white powdery substance
in it" (id.). Between the seats in the console area, Officer Bumham found a partially full
bottle of vodka (id.).
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Following these discoveries, Officer Burnham tried unsuccessfully to reach
defendant (R72:7-8), add. A. He also talked with the property owner, who indicated that
he wanted the minivan removed so that he could repair his damaged property fences
(R72:5-6), add. A\ (R73:10), add. B. Accordingly, Officer Burnham arranged for the
minivan to be towed, which towing occurred at approximately 9:35 a.m. (R72:6), add. A\
(R73:13), add. B. While Officer Bumham did not perform a written inventory of all of
the mini van's contents, he did "look through the entire vehicle for any valuables"
(R72:8), add. A\ (R73:l 1-12), add. B. The only valuables that he retrieved, and
consequently recorded, were the briefcase and the purse and its contents (R72:7), add. A\
R73:12-13), add. B. In total, Officer Burnham was at the scene of the wreck for one and
one-half hours or until approximately 10:00 a.m. (R73:13), add. B.
Later that afternoon, the towing company contacted Officer Bumham with
information that defendant was trying to recover the wrecked minivan (R72:6), add. A.
When Officer Bumham met with defendant at the wrecking yard he asked her about the
baggie he had found and defendant "kind of laughed and said [she had forgotten] about
that" (R72:7), add. A. Defendant said the baggie belonged to a friend and admitted that it
contained cocaine (id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court properly found that an emergency existed here given the
circumstances of the wreck, i.e., defendant's minivan jumped a curb in the middle of a
snowy night and went through two property fences before coming to a stop in a marsh.
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Given the emergency, the trial court properly ruled that police could search a purse left in
open view inside the wrecked minivan for the missing driver's (defendant's)
identification under the emergency aid doctrine. A warrantless search of personal effects
is justified under the emergency aid doctrine where, as here, persons are missing and
feared to be injured or dead.
Alternatively, the trial court's ruling may be affirmed on the ground that defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the minivan or its contents after she wrecked
it on another's property, failed to secure her valuables left within, and also failed to
"immediately" notify the property owner of the damage or to leave her contact
information "in a conspicuous place on the vehicle" as required by the motor vehicle
code.
ARGUMENT
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF A PURSE FOUND LYING ON
THE FLOOR OF A WRECKED AND UNLOCKED MINIVAN FOR
EVIDENCE OF THE MISSING DRIVER'S IDENTIFICATION WAS
JUSTIFIED UNDER THE EMERGENCY AID DOCTRINE
Defendant challenges the trial court's reliance on the emergency aid exception to
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement to justify the warrantless search of her
purse (R47-48), add. C. Officer Burnham searched defendant's purse for identification
after finding it lying on the floor of a wrecked and unlocked minivan and the driver
(defendant), whose whereabouts were unknown, was feared to be in some "distress and
lost or disoriented" (R47), add. C. For reasons set forth below, defendant's challenge
lacks merit.
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A.

The Fourth Amendment Standard: Reasonableness.

"The touchstone of [an] analysis under the Fourth Amendment is always 'the
reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular government invasion of a
citizen's personal security.'" Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 108-109 (1977)
(quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,19 (1968)). "For 'what the Constitution forbids is not
all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Terry, 392 U.S. at 9
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (I960)). Thus, while "police must,
whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through
the warrant procedure," the emergency situation in this case is illustrative of a specific
category of cases wherein courts have recognized that the exigencies confronting police
render the warrant requirement impractical. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added). See
Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12,fflf10-13, 994 P.2d 1283.
B.

The Emergency Aid Doctrine Recognizes Law
Enforcement's Dual Roles as Investigators and
Community Caretakers.

Indeed, the emergency aid doctrine recognizes that police necessarily interact with
the public for a variety of purposes beyond law enforcement in their dual role as law
enforcers and community caretakers:
Communities have always looked to local police to perform social services
unrelated or at best partially related to enforcing criminal law. 'Community
caretaking' denotes a wide range of everyday police activities undertaken to
aid those in danger of physical harm, to preserve property, or 'to create and
maintain a feeling of security in the community.' It includes things like the
mediation of noise disputes, the response to complaints about stray and
injured animals, and the provision of assistance to the ill or injured. Police
must frequently 'care for those who cannot care for themselves: the
7
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destitute, the inebriated, the addicted . . . and the very young.' They are
often charged with taking lost property into their possession; they not
infrequently see to the removal of abandoned property. In those places
where social disorganization is at its highest, police are even called upon 'to
serve as surrogate parent or other relative, and to fill in for social workers,
housing inspectors, attorneys, physicians, and psychiatrists.' Community
caretaking, then, is an essential part of the functioning of local police. It in
fact occupies such a high proportion of police time that one can even
question 'the value of viewing the police primarily as part of the criminal
justice system.'
Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amendment, 1998 U.
Chi. Legal F. 261, 271-272 (citations omitted). See Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 11
(observing that emergency aid doctrine "'reflects a recognition that the police perform a
community caretaking function which goes beyond fighting crime'" (quotation omitted));

\

Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360, 362 (Utah App. 1992) (recognizing that police are
often called upon to interact with the public for reasons "unrelated to a penal or
regulatory purpose" as when conducting a community caretaker automobile stop), aff'd
875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994). See also State v. Mountford, 769 A.2d 639, 643 n.4 (Vt. 2000)
(recognizing that emergency aid and community caretaker exceptions to warrant

(

requirement, "both involve the police operating outside of a criminal law enforcement
role").

l

Thus, the question in an emergency is not whether police acted upon probable
cause to believe a crime has, or is being committed, but whether there is "evidence which
would lead a prudent and reasonable official to see a need to act." Wayne v. United
States, 318 F.2d 205,212 (D.C. Cir. 1963). "The need to protect or preserve life or avoid
serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or
8
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<

emergency." Wayne, 318 F.2d at 212. This determination is necessarily "pragmatic" and
"contingent" on the reasonableness of the police action in light of an officer's "multiple"
caretaking responsibilities. See Livingston, supra 261-263.
The emergency aid doctrine accordingly supports "'a warrantless search of a
person or personal effects when [a] person is found in an unconscious or semiconscious
condition and the purpose of the search is to discover identification and other information
that might enhance the prospect of administering appropriate medical assistance[.]"
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 10 (quoting Tracy A. Bateman, Annotation, Lawfulness of
Search of Person or Personal Effects Under Medical Emergency Exception to Warrant
Requirement, 11 A.L.R. 5th, § 2(a) (1993)) (plurality). As further recognized by the
Davidson plurality, "[s]everal courts have also applied the emergency aid doctrine when,"
as here, "a person is missing and feared to be injured or dead." Id. at ^ 10 (citing People
v. Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d 607 (1976)). See State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 549-550 (Utah
App. 1997) (disagreeing with majority that police had probable cause to search, but
recognizing that police did have a "reasonable basis" upon which to conduct warrantless
search of defendant's apartment for missing child under the emergency aid doctrine
(Greenwood, J., concurring in the result)).
The criteria of the emergency aid doctrine, set forth in the Davidson plurality,
includes the following:
(1) Police have an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency
exists and believe there is an immediate need for their assistance for the
protection of life.

9
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(2) The search is not primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize
evidence.
(3) There is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area
or place to be searched. That is, there must be a connection with the area to
be searched and the emergency.
Id. at f 12 (adopting standard articulated in Yoder, 935 P.2d at 550 (Greenwood, J.,
concurring in result).
C.

Defendant Fails to Marshall the Evidence Supporting the
Trial Court's Factual Finding That an Emergency Existed
and His Challenge Should be Rejected on That Ground.

The trial court evaluated these criteria and correctly determined that the emergency
aid doctrine justified the warrantless search of defendant's purse, which she left in an
unlocked minivan after wrecking it on another's property:
[T]he community caretaker function of the officer was properly invoked
here.1 The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold January night.
The absence of the driver made it imperative that the officer identify the
driver so that he or she could be found. The officer acted appropriately in
attempting to determine who was the driver. Although the [djefendant
makes a good point that the owner of the vehicle could be ascertained by
*The trial court's reference to Officer Burnham's "community caretaker function''
(R62) (emphasis) should not be confused with Utah's "community caretaker stop"
doctrine. See Warden, 844 P.2d at 362. While the two concepts are related, the trial court
is referencing the officer's community caretaking function or purpose with regard to noninvestigatory and general activities "undertaken to aid those in danger of physical harm,
to preserve property, or 'to create and maintain a feeling of security in the community'"
See Livingston, supra 271-272. The community caretaker stop doctrine, on the other
hand, specifically concerns "police vehicle stops unrelated to a penal or regulatory
purpose." Warden, 844 P.2d at 362 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the requirements of a
community caretaker stop differ slightly from the more widely applicable emergency aid
doctrine. See Warden, 844 P.2d at 364 (setting forth requirements for a community
caretaker stop: (1) a seizure, (2) in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker function,
(3) under circumstances demonstrating "an imminent danger to life or limb[.]"). See also
Mountford, 769 A.2d at 644-645 & n. 1.
10
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using the license plate number, the owner and the driver are not necessarily
the same person, and the officer had a duty to ascertain the facts in order to
preserve life in the event the driver had wandered off and was lost. As
such, all three prongs of the [Davidson] test are satisfied[:] (1) [t]he officer
had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency existed—a
vehicle involved in an accident in the early morning hours that had been left
by is driver[;] (2) [t]he officer testified that the search was for the purpose
of ascertaining who was the driver so that the motivation was not primarily
to arrest or seize evidence, and (3) it was reasonable to search the purse in
connection with the emergency.
(R46-47), add. C.2
Because the determination of the emergency aid exception is "fact-intensive,"
Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 10, defendant is required to marshal the evidence in
support of the trial court's findings and then show, when viewing the evidence in the
"light most favorable to the trial court's ruling," why the findings are erroneous. See
State in re J. W,, 2001 UT App 208, f 9, 30 P.3d 1232. The marshaling requirement
applies even when the evidence is undisputed—for an appellant must still argue all
"supporting" evidence. Cf. id.
Here, defendant has wholly failed to do so. Ignoring the evidence in support of the
trial court's ruling, defendant baldly asserts that no emergency existed here under the first
prong of the Davidson plurality's test. Aplt. Br. at 7-8. But defendant does not explain
why the trial court's contrary finding, based on the undisputed evidence, is wrong.
Rather, he simply and impermissibly "reargues the weight of that evidence." See J. W.,
2

In so ruling, the trial court rejected the State's argument that defendant abandoned
her minivan and her purse (R45-46), add. C. And even though the State did not rely on
impoundment to justify the search, the trial court also found that the search was not
justifiable as a formal impound/inventory search because Officer Bumham did not
officially impound the minivan or complete a formal inventory (R45), add. C.
11
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2001 UT App 208, If 10. Defendant specifically complains that the "routine" accident
occurred on a "major thoroughfare," "was visible from the roadway," Officer Burnham
never searched the surrounding area for the missing driver, and there was no "blood,
smashed windshield, body damage or other objective evidence that may lead one to
believe that anyone was injured during the accident." Aplt. Br. at 7.3 Because defendant
wholly fails to address the evidence supporting the trial court's finding of an emergency,
e.g., that the minivan jumped a curb in the middle of a snowy night and went through two
fences before stopping in a swamp or marsh, that the presumptive driver and/or
passengers left behind a briefcase and purse in the unlocked minivan, and that the driver's
and any passengers' whereabouts since the wreck were unknown {see R72:2-5), add. A,
defendant's challenge may be summarily rejected. State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 &
n.2, 1 P.3d 1108.

3

Defendant asserts Officer Burnham never searched the surrounding area for the
missing driver and/or passengers, but in fact no one asked the officer if he searched the
surrounding area {see R72), add. A; (R73), add. B. Officer Burnham was at the accident
scene for approximately one and one-half hours or from 8:30 a.m. until approximately
10:00 a.m., with the minivan being towed away at approximately 9:35 a.m. {see R73:13),
add. B. It is arguably reasonable to infer that the officer spent some of that time checking
the surrounding area.
12
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D.

The Trial Court Properly Evaluated the Facts of the
Wreck to Determine That the Warrantless Search of
Defendant's Purse was Justified as Emergency Aid.

Alternatively, if the merits of defendant's challenge to the trial court's finding of
an emergency are considered, the trial court's ruling is correct. Based on the undisputed
facts of the wreck, i.e., defendant's minivan jumped a curb in the middle of a snowy night
and ploughed through two fences before coming to a stop in a swamp or marsh this was
no routine accident {see R72:2-5), add. A. Therefore, the trial court properly determined
that Officer Bumham had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that an emergency
existed and that there was an immediate need, for the protection of life, to search the
wrecked and unlocked minivan for the missing driver's identification (R46-47), add, C.
See Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, f 12 (plurality). The search of defendant's purse, found
lying on the floor of the minivan, yielded in addition to her identification, however, a
cocaine baggy.4
The emerjgency circumstances noted above justified searching the minivan for the
missing driver's identification as well as defendant's purse as the most likely repository
of the driver's identification inside the minivan. Contrary to defendant's assertion, an
emergency can exist even absent bloody evidence indicating that supposed and missing
4

Officer Burnham also discovered an open container inside the minivan (see
R72:5), add. A. If Officer Burnham saw the open container prior to searching the purse,
that fact would further support his belief that the driver may be in a condition requiring
assistance and/or would provide independent grounds of probable cause plus exigent
circumstances to justify the warrantless search. However, it is not clear in the record that
the officer saw the open container prior to searching the minivan or defendant's purse,
and therefore the State does not rely on the open container as an independent ground
justifying the search here.
13
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victims are seriously injured. See Aplt. Br. at 7. Indeed, the fact that the supposed
missing female driver in this case left her purse and its contents in open view for over six
hours on the floor of an unlocked minivan wrecked on another's property is in itself
alarming, whether or not it was spattered with blood. Mitchell, also involving a supposed
victim whose whereabouts were unknown, is a seminal emergency aid case which
illustrates the point. 347 N.E.2d 607.
In Mitchell, a hotel chambermaid was reported missing after she failed to deliver
clean linens to a guest as promised. Id. at 608. Coworkers found the chambermaid's
street clothes and partially eaten lunch on the sixth floor of the hotel, where she was last
seen. Id. Police assisted hotel management in a search for the missing chambermaid. Id.
Vacant rooms were checkedfirst,then occupied rooms. Id. Eventually, police knocked
on Mitchell's sixth floor door and he denied seeing the chambermaid. Id. After a
consensual, cursory glance around his room, the officer departed. Id. Later that
afternoon, a homicide detective arrived to assist and another room-by-room search
commenced. Id. The last room to be searched was Mitchell's sixth floor room. Id. The
detective entered Mitchell's room with a management passkey and, "looking more
carefully than his fellow officers had previously, noticed reddish brown stains on the
bedding, rug and bathroom wall." Id. at 608-609. The chambermaid's body was found
after the detective opened a closet door and saw two human feet sticking out from undei a
laundry basket. Id. at 609.

14
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Addressing the first prong of the emergency aid doctrine, the Mitchell court upheld
the detective's warrantless entry and search of Mitchell's room because there were
"reasonable grounds" to believe an emergency existed—based on the chambermaid's
unexplained absence and her failure to respond when summoned, and little else, i.e., her
street clothes and half-eaten lunch. Id. at 610. Notably, the bloody evidence that
eventually led to the discovery of the chambermaid's body was not found until after the
warrantless entry of Mitchell's hotel room. Id. at 608-609. Notwithstanding the absence
of evidence specifically indicating that the chambermaid had either "been struck with
some illness, suffered an accident or possibly fallen victim to a crime," the Mitchell court
concluded that "all of the circumstances led to the conclusion that some grave misfortune
of an indeterminate nature had befallen the chambermaid." Id. at 610. See also Yoder,
935 P.2d at 550 (finding "an emergency situation existed because of the missing child,
discovery of her clothing, the cold temperature, and the amount of time that had passed
since the child's disappearance") (Greenwood, J., concurring in the result).
Here, the trial court properly found that Officer Burnham was similarly justified in
believing that an emergency existed and required his immediate action for the protection
of life, even absent a specific and bloody indication that the missing minivan driver was
"in distress and lost or disoriented" (R47), add. C. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, ^ 12
(plurality); Mitchell, 347 N.E.2d at 610. As found the trial court, the wreck occurred in
the wee hours of a cold and snowy January morning (R47), add. C. The wrecked minivan
went over a "curb, down an embankment," and "through two fences" before finally
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coming to a stop "out in the marsh" (R72:3), add. A. When Officer Burnham was
dispatched to the accident scene approximately six hours later, snow covered the tracks,
the driver and/or passengers were gone, and a briefcase and purse were inexplicably left
unsecured and in open view on the floor of the minivan (R72:4), add. A. Contrary to
defendant's assertion, this was no "routine accident." Aplt. Br. at 7.
Nor is the instant accident rendered a non-emergency by the fact the officer may
not have searched the swampy area for the missing driver and/or passengers, as further
asserted by defendant.5 Aplt. Br. at 7. While searching the marshy area surrounding the
wreck may have also been reasonable, the officer's decision to identify the missing driver
and to try and contact her by phone was also a reasonable course to purse (R72:4), add. C.
Indeed, knowing the identity of the missing driver would seem key to an efficient and
successful effort to locate the driver and/or any passengers. If the Officer had been able
to contact the driver and ascertain his or her well-being, no further search would have
been necessary. If not, he still may have been able to obtain information regarding the
identities of the driver and any passengers, and whether the driver and/or passengers
suffered from any medical conditions. As found by the trial court, the registered owner
would not necessarily be the driver, thus attempting to identify the driver was the more
reasonable and efficient course (see R47), add. C. Finally, if defendant had a left a note
in a conspicuous place on the minivan identifying herself and explaining her absence, she
arguably could have obviated the need to ascertain her identity. See UTAH CODE ANN. §

(

5

See n.3, supra.
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41-6-32(1) (1998 & Supp. 2002) (requiring a driver who damages another's unattended
property to "immediately" "locate and notify . . . the owner of other property of the
operator's name and address and the registration number of the vehicle causing the
damage; or attach securely in a conspicuous place on the vehicle or other property a
written notice giving the operator's name and address and the registration number of the
vehicle causing the damage"). Officer Burnham reasonably and "diligently pursu[ed] a
means of investigation which [was] likely to resolve the matter one way or another very
soon[.]" Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 703 n.14 (1981) (quotation omitted);
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-687 (1985) ("The fact that the protection of
the public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by 'less intrusive' means does
not by itself, render the search unreasonable") (quoting Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413 U.S.
433, 447 (1973)). Accord United States v. Neff, 300 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing that courts "should not engage in 'unrealistic second-guessing' of a police
officer's decision").
In sum, the trial court properly determined that Officer Burnham reasonably
believed an emergency existed and that he needed, for the protection of life, to identify
the missing driver and/or passengers sooner rather than later (R47), add, C. See Yoder,
935 P.2d at 550 (Greenwood, J., concurring in the result). In searching the deserted
minivan and the purse in open view for identification, Officer Burnham reasonably
fulfilled society's expectation that police will act as community caretakers. See

17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Livingston, supra 271-272. The trial court's ruling denying the suppression motion
should therefore be affirmed.
E.

Alternatively, Defendant Had No Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in Her Purse Left in Open View in an Unlocked Minivan
For Several Hours After Wrecking the Minivan on Another's
Property.

\

While the trial court found that defendant had not abandoned her minivan for
purposes of the abandoned vehicle statute, UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-116.10 (1998 &
Supp. 2002), the trial court did observe that the expectation of privacy in an abandoned
vehicle "is greatly lessened," and that the "presumption of abandonment" in the statute
(seven days) is not "coextensive" with the abandonment "for purposes of fourth

{

amendment analysis"6 (R45), add. C. Seet e.g., United States v. Barlow, 17 F.3d 85, 88
(4th Cir.) (observing that for fourth amendment purposes the "accused need not have
abandoned the search item in the strict property sense, where an intent to relinquish
ownership must be shown; merely an intent to voluntarily to relinquish his privacy
interest is sufficient."), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 850 (1994). In rejecting the State's
abandonment theory here, the trial court observed that if the minivan were driveable it
was more likely that it had been abandoned, but there was no evidence as to the minivan's

{

driveability (R46), add. C. In so focusing, the trial court arguably overlooked defendant's
failure to take any action to secure the purse she left in the wrecked minivan, as well as
i

6

The 2001 amendments to section 41-6-116.10, in effect at the time of the trial
court's ruling, deleted the statutory presumption which is now a definition of
abandonment.
18
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her concomitant statutory duty to identify herself to the owner of damaged property
"immediately;1 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-32 (1998 & Supp. 2002).
However, notwithstanding the trial court's rejection of the State's abandonment
theory there is a related alternative ground upon which to affirm the ruling below:
defendant could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the minivan or her purse on
these facts. See Califoria v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988) ("An expectation of
privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment protection . .. unless society is prepared
to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable"). See also Wyoming v. Houghton,
526 U.S. 295, 303 (1999) (recognizing that both drivers and passengers have a "reduced
expectation of privacy with regard to property that they transport in cars, which . . . are
exposed to traffic accidents that may render all their contents open to public scrutiny"
(citations omitted)). Even though the minivan was not formally abandoned under section
41-6-116.10, for Fourth Amendment purposes, defendant exposed her purse to public
scrutiny and thus could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in it after she left it
inside a wrecked and unsecured minivan on someone else's property. See Cormney v.
Commonwealth, 943 S.W.2d 629, 632 (Ky. App. 1997) (holding that "any subjective
expectation of privacy that [defendant] had in the wreckage necessarily yielded to the
Commonwealth's legitimate public safety interests since the law enforcement officials
responding to the accident were charged with the responsibility of determining all of the
circumstances surrounding the fatality and the cause of the collision"). While the trial
court did not expressly rely on this theory as a reason for denying the motion to suppress,
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(

(

(

(

(
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or police that the driver was not so incapacitated as to be incapable of written
communication and/or had left the scene to seek help. Having failed to do any of these
things, however, defendant failed to exhibit even an subjective expectation of privacy in
the minivan or its contents. Jackson, 937 P.2d at 549 n.3.
Further, any expectation of privacy defendant may yet claim is not "one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Id. In State v. Holden, 964 P.2d 318,
322 (Utah App.), cert denied, 982 P.2d 88 (1998), police videotaped Holden's drug
related activity in his front yard from their vantage point across the street inside a
neighbor's home. When Holden challenged the surreptitious videotaping, this Court held
that he had "no subjective expectation of privacy in the activities in his front yard visible
from his neighbor's window." Id. Nor was Holden's expectation of privacy in his front
yard activities one that society was wiling to accept as reasonable. Id. at 322 n. 1.
Here, defendant's expectation of privacy is even less. She left her purse and brief
case in an unlocked minivan after wrecking it on another's property, leaving no note or
other readily discernible identifying or contact information for the hapless property owner
{see, e.g., R72:4-5), add. A. Accordingly, the trial court's ruling may be affirmed on the
sound alternative ground that defendant demonstrated no subjective expectation of
privacy in the contents of the wrecked minivan, nor would an expectation of privacy in
the wrecked minivan or its contents be one that society would willingly accept as
reasonable. Jackson, 937 P.2d at 549 n.3; Holden, 964 P.2d at 322.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the trial court's application of the emergency aid doctrine
to uphold the warrantless search of defendant's minivan and purse. Alternatively, the
trial court's ruling can be affirmed on the ground that defendant could have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the wrecked minivan or its contents.
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Pa;
THE CLERK:

1

Case number 021-39.

2 versus Tanja Rynhart.
3

THE COURT:

State of,Utah

.

Are counsel ready to proceed or do you

4 need a moment?
5

MR. RETALLICK:

I'm ready, Your Honor.

6

MR. BUNDERSON:

Let me see if I can do it with just

7 this officer, Your Honor.
8

(Pause in the proceedings.)

9

MR. BUNDERSON:

Let's try it with just Officer

10 Burnham, Your Honor.
11

THE COURT:

12

MR. BUNDERSON:

All right.

Go ahead.

Call Bob Burnham to the stand.

13

ROBERT BURNHAM,

14

being first duly sworn, was examined and

15

testified as follows:

16

DIRECT EXAMINATION

17 BY MR. BUNDERSON:
18 Q.

Your name is Robert Burnham and you're an officer with

19 the Brigham City police department, is that correct?
20 A.

Yes. .

21 Q.

You're currently working patrol, do I understand that

22 correctly?
23 A.

Yes.

24 Q.

Were you doing that on the 5th, 6th and 7th of January,

25 that time frame, of this year?
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1 A.

Yes.

2

Q.

I'll call your attention to the matter before the court.

3

At some time on or about January 6th, about 10 in the

4

morning, did you have occasion to respond to what at first

5

appeared to be an abandoned or wrecked vehicle in a field?

6 I A.

Yes.

It was a little earlier than that, but, yes, I did,

7

Q.

Approximately what time?

8

A.

8:30.

9 1 Q.

Did you get a call from someone or notice it yourself?

10 A.

Dispatch called me.

11 Q.

Where was it?

12 A.

On West Forest Street, about 1240 West.

13

Somebody had called them.

Straight north

and west of the animal shelter.

14 Q.

Okay.

What did you find when you got there?

15 A.

There was a van out in the middle of a swamp, a marsh

16

area.

It had gone through a couple of fences.

17

over the curb, down an embankment, through two fences and

18

came to rest out in the marsh.

19 Q.

On its wheels still?

20 A.

Yes, it was on its wheels.

21 Q.

Did you walk out to the van?

22 A.

I did.

23

Did the van have a license plate on it?

Q.

It traveled

24 A.

Yes, it did.

25

Did you make an attempt to call in anything regarding the

Q.
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1

plate before you went out to look at the van?

2

A.

3

not.

4

there and there wasn't anybody in it.

5

the owner.

6

Q.

I'm sorry.

7

A.

We did try and call the owner and there was no one who

8

answered the phone.

9

Q.

10 A.

Umm, I don't know if I could read the license plate or
I don't remember from that distance.

I walked out

We did try and call

You called the owner?

Who was the registered owner, do you recall?
I don't remember if there was more than one name on it,

11

but Tanja Rynhart was one of them, if not the only registered

12

owner.

13

Q.

14

when the vehicle had left the road?

15 A.

All right.

Did you have any evidence at that time as to

There was snow on the ground.

It had snowed as recently

16

as 3:00 that morning.

17

prior to 3:00 because of the snow on the ground.

18

Q.

19

with snow?

20 A.

It appeared that it had happened just

There were no tracks in the snow or they were covered

Let me look.

(Pause.)

It was prior to 3:00, yes,

21

because the tire tracks had been covered off the side of r-he

22

road by the snow.

23

Q.

And this is about 8:30, approximately?

24 A.

Yes.

25

When you got to the van there was no one in it.

Q.
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What did

1

you then do?

2

A.

3

find some identification.

4

the owner, the driver, and if anybody was in the vehicle at

I opened the vehicle up, got in it, to see if I couid
Try to find out the identity of

5 all.
6

Q.

7

contact the owner?

8

A.

9 1 Q.
10 A.

Now, was this before or after you had made attempts to

It was before.
Okay.

What did you find in the vehicle?

I found a valise or a briefcase on the front passenger

11

seat; and a purse, a woman's purse, on the floor of the front

12

passenger side.

13 Q.

What did you do then?

14 A.

I looked through both of them and found a driver's

15

license, identification, to Ms. Rynhart.

16

also was $329 in cash, a couple of gift certificates to

17

Smith's and a small bag that had a white powdery substance in

18 1 it.

Inside the purse

Also, in the console area between the two seats of the

19

van, was a partially -- an opened and partially full bottle

20

of vodka.

21

Q.

22

substance in it, turned out to be cocaine, is that correct?

Okay.

This white baggie, this baggie with a white

23 A.

That's what the defendant told me later, yes.

24 Q.

Where was that in relation to the wallet and the purse,

25

can you tell me that?

Were they separate, do you recall?
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1

A.

2

d i d n f t m a k e a n o t e in m y r e p o r t .

3

Q.

4

container?

5

locating and retrieving the wallet from the purse, do you

6

recall if the bag of white substance was visible while you

7

were doing that or was it inside another container of some

8

sort?

9 I A.

A s I r e c a l l , the b a g g i e w a s -- I c a n ' t r e m e m b e r .

I

Do y o u r e c a l l if y o u h a d to o p e n a n y o t h e r kind o f
A f t e r o p e n i n g t h e p u r s e a n d d u r i n g t h e p r o c e s s of

A s I r e c a l l , it w a s in w i t h t h e w a l l e t a n d I d o n ' t

10

opening anything else to get to it.

11

Q.

recall

Did you eventually talk with Ms. Rynhart that day?

12 A.

Yes, I did.

13 Q.

Is this her seated next to counsel here?

14 A.

Yes, it is.

15

Q.

Where did you find her?

16

A.

I w a s in t h e p r o c e s s o f -- d u r i n g t h e m o r n i n g I h a d a

17

wrecker come and take the vehicle out of the field.

18

p r i o r to t w o p . m . that same d a y I r e c e i v e d a call from the

19

w r e c k e r c o m p a n y that she w a s d o w n there t r y i n g to recover h e r

20

vehicle.

21

Q.

22 A.

Just

Was there an impound done of the vehicle?
We just towed it for safe keeping, to get it up out of

23

the field, and so the field owner, the property owner, could

24

get their fences repaired.

25

Q.

Under the Brigham City police policy, under those
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1 circumstances, could you have conducted an inventory?
2 A.

Yes.

3 Q.

Did you retain the purse and the briefcase?

4 A.

Yes.

5 Q.

Did you go to the wrecking yard?

6 A.

Yes.

7 Q.

Okay.

8 A.

I did.

9 Q.

Did you ask her about the bag of white substance?

And you talked with the defendant there?

10 A.

I did.

11 Q.

What did she tell you?

12 A.

She told me that -- she kind of laughed and said I forgot

13 about that.

She said it belonged to a friend of hers.

She

14 also told me that it was cocaine.
15 Q.

Okay.

Do you know if Officer DeRyke pursued the matter

.16 any further?
17 A.

Officer DeRyke was involved at the time with the Box

18 Elder County strike force, narcotic strike force.

That

19

information was passed along to him.

20

impression that he met with Ms. Rynhart on at least one

21 occasion after that.
22 Q.

I'm under the

I don1t know to what end.

At what point did you make your first call to the -- in

23 an attempt to locate Ms. Rynhart or the other owner, if there
24

was another owner?

25 A.

Well, it would have been sometime after 8:30.
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I tried tc

1 call her several times personally from my office after I'd
2 cleared from the scene.
3 Q.

In context, though, of the events occurring, would that

4 call have been your first call or your request of dispatch to
5 make the first call, have been made before or after you
6

retrieved the purse and the briefcase?

7 I A.

It would have been after.

8

MR. BUNDERSON:

Okay.

That's all I have.

Thank

9 you.
10

THE COURT:

11

MR. RETALLICK:

12

Cross-examine.
Thank you, Your Honor.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

13 BY MR. RETALLICK:
14 Q.

Officer Burnham, are you familiar with the abandoned

15 vehicle statute in the state of Utah?
16 A.

Yes.

17 Q.

Okay.

How long does a vehicle have to sit when itfs on

18 public or private property before it's considered abandoned?
19 A.

Private property is seven days.

20 Q.

Okay.

And the vehicle hadn't sat there for seven days,

21 is that correct?
22 A.

That's correct.

23 Q.

There was no attempt to do an impound inventory as

24 required by Brigham City police department policy?
25 A.

I didn't do a written inventory, no.
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1

Q.

Okay.

Did you have a handheld microphone, you know,

2

radio communication device with you when you approached the

3

vehicle?

4 A.

A walkie-talkie?

5

Q.

Yes.

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

And so when you got there you could see the license plate

8

and could have radioed the plate in and found out who the

9

owner was, is that correct?

10 I A.

That is a possibility.

I don't know if I did at that

11 I point or not, but I could have, yes.
12 Q.

Well, you indicated in your testimony that you opened up

13

the vehicle before trying to make contact with the owner, is

14

that correct?

15 A.

Yes.

16 Q.

Did you open up the vehicle and begin your search of the

17 vehicle before or after you radioed the license plate in to
18

find out who the owner was?

19 A.

I don't remember.

20 Q.

Okay.

21
22
23

MR. BUNDERSON:

I'm sorry.

What was the question,

MR. RETALLICK:

I asked him if he began his search

counsel?

24

of the vehicle before or after he radioed in the license

25

plate to try and find out who the owner of the vehicle was.
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1

Q.

(BY MR. RETALLICK)

You didn't need to go through the

2

briefcase or the purse in order to determine whether there

3

was anybody hurt or injured inside the vehicle, is that

4 J correct?
5

A.

That's correct.

6

Q.

All right.

7

you searched the purse and that's where -- it was inside the

8

purse is where you located the suspected item of cocaine, is

And in your police report you indicate that

9 I that correct?
10 A.

Yes.

11

Did you NIK test this?

Q.

12 I A.

I did not.

13

Q.

All right.

14

was cocaine?

Officer DeRyke did.
Do you have a lab result indicating that it

15 A.

I do not.

16

Q.

Okay.

17

that it was cocaine, but you said you asked her about the

In your police report you don't say that she said

18 J cocaine and she smiled and said it belonged to a friend of
19

hers?

20 A.

That's correct.

21

Didn't she also indicate that she does not use drugs?

Q.

22 A.

That's what she told me, yes.

23

And so she was basically telling you what someone else

Q.

24 I had told her, is that correct?
25 I A.

(No response.)
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1

Q.

Relating to you what it was -- her knowledge of what it

2

was was based on what someone else told her, is that correct?

3 A.

That was my assumption.

4

Q.

All right.

5

you have this vehicle towed from their property?

6

A.

He asked me when it would be taken away.

7

Q.

And you didn't -- you obviously have knowledge of the

8

statute and you didn't inform him that under the statute it

9

basically has to sit there for seven days before you can

10

Did the owner of the property request that

authorize its impounding, is that correct?

11 A.

No, we didn't discuss that.

12 Q.

All right.

13 1
14

MR. BUNDERSON:

that's exactly what the statute says, Your Honor.

15
16

By the way, we don't agree that

MR. RETALLICK:

If you want, Your Honor, I'll

present the statute to the court.

You can take judicial

17 I notice of what the statute says.
18

THE COURT:

What is the reference?

19

MR. BUNDERSON:

41-6-116.10 and IB.

An abandoned

20

vehicle is a vehicle left unattended on public or private

21

property for a period in excess of seven days without express

22

or implied consent of the owner or person in lawful

23

possession or control of the property.

24

Q.

25

a copy of any lab results?

(BY MR. RETALLICK)

Have you seen any lab results, gotten
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1 A.

The only involvement I've had with that case was just

2 that morning.

I've not seen any reports.

MR. RETALLICK:

3

Thank you.

Nothing further, Your

4 Honor.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUNDERSON:
Q.

Have you, by report of Officer DeRyke, another police

officer, been informed that the NIK test showed positive for
cocaine?
10 A.

That's correct.

11 Q.

You mentioned that this was near or the vehicle had

12 bypassed an animal shelter that is a city owned animal
13 shelter?
14 A.

It was across the street.

15 Q.

That's a building?

16 A.

Yes. '

17 Q.

Was it within a thousand feet of that?

18 A.

Yes.

19 Q.

And we charged a paraphernalia charge.

I'm sorry, I

20 didn't hear any mention of any paraphernalia.

Did you find

21 anything?
22 A.

There was a mirror with some powder on it that was also

23 in the vehicle.
24 Q.

Do you recall where that was?

25 A.

It was in the purse.
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1

Q.

The same purse?

2

A.

In the same purse as the

3

MR. BUNDERSON:

4

THE C O U R T :

5

MR. RETALLICK:

6

THE C O U R T :

7

MR. BUNDERSON:

8

THE C O U R T :

9

MR. R E T A L L I C K :

identification.

Thank you.

Anything

That's all

I have.

further?

No/ Your Honor.

You may step d o w n .
Y e s , Your

Anything

Does the state

from the

defense?

Move to d i s m i s s , Your

Honor.

There's a b s o l u t e l y not one shred of e v i d e n c e

11

found, or the item found, was in fact a controlled

13

rest?

Honor.

10

12

13

that the

items

substance.

MR. BUNDERSON:

Her a d m i s s i o n and the NIK test, Your

MR. R E T A L L I C K :

Your H o n o r , her a d m i s s i o n was

Honor.

14
15

this was -- b e l o n g e d

to a friend.

16

told her it was cocaine and she said this is something

17

belonged

18

somebody p o s s e s s e s something

19

controlled

20

Honor.

to a friend.

The officer stated that he

There's no -- the simple

MR. BUNDERSON:

22

THE COURT:

that

fact if

that they m a y think may be a

substance is insufficient

21

that

I don't

to bind over,

Your

think that's what she said.

The criteria is reasonable grounds.

I had m a d e , and i t f s p o s s i b l e

23

note

24

n o t e , but the note I m a d e indicated

25

cocaine which b e l o n g e d

I didn't make a correct
that she said it was

to a friend. •
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1

MR. RETALLICK:

Your Honor, the officer's report,

2

and I can quote that for you, indicates "I asked her if the

3

purse in the van was hers.

4

asked her about the cocaine.

5

it belonged to a friend of hers.

6

indulge in drugs.

7

to the accident and she implied no."

8
9

She stated that it was.

She sort of smiled and stated
She claimed she does not

I asked her if she'd been drinking prior

That does not indicate knowledge.
what is this.

I then

This is cocaine.

The officer is saying

Where did you get it.

She

10

says that was given to me by a friend.

It does not indicate

11

that sufficient knowledge -- even if she believed it was

12

cocaine and it turned out not to be cocaine, they couldn't go

13

forward on the charge, Your Honor.

14

MR. BUNDERSON:

15

Honor, not what's in his report.

16

told him it was cocaine.

17

cross-examination, again, if I recall correctly, he clarified

18

that and said that he assumed she meant it was cocaine.

19

addition, of course, we have the NIK test.

20
21
22
23
24
25

MR. RETALLICK:

His testimony is what counts, Your
My recollection is that she

And when questioned on

In

But there is no evidence of the NIK

test, Your Honor.
MR. BUNDERSON:

Hearsay in a preliminary hearing is

admissible.
MR. RETALLICK:

But he didn't say whether it was

positive or negative and didn't say whether he witnessed it.
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1
2
31

THE COURT:

He didn't say he witnessed it, but he

said that there was a flash test that was positive.
The court finds that there are reasonable grounds to

4 1 believe that the defendant committed the offense.
5

Reasonable

grounds is certainly a lower standard than applies at trial,

6 1 as counsel is well aware.

The court will require that the

• 7 defendant be held to answer on the charges,
8
9

Does she want to go ahead and conduct the arraignment
right now?

10

MR. RBTALLICK:

11

THE COURT:

12

of the information.

13

reading of those charges?

Yes, Your Honor.

Okay.

She's previously received a copy

Does the defendant waive the formal

14

MR. RETALLICK:

15

THE COURT:

16

how does the defendant plead?

17
18

As to the charges in counts one and two,

MR. RETALLICK:

THE COURT:

We'll be

motion

How much time do you need to get

your

filed?

21

MR. RETALLICK:

22

THE COURT:

23

Not guilty, Your Honor.

filing a motion to suppress in this case.

19
20

Yes, Your Honor.

Probably two weeks, Your Honor.

Okay.

June 12th.

How much time would

the state need to respond after that?

24

MR. BUNDERSON:

25

THE COURT:

A couple of weeks, please.

Okay.

June 12th and then June 26th.
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1 we have time to put this on for a hearing on the 8th or 9th
2 any time?
3

(Discussion off the record.)

4

MR. RETALLICK:

My client is out of town on

5 business, Your Honor, on the 8th and 9th.
6

THE COURT:

Let's go two weeks later.

7 22nd, which is a Monday, at 2:30?

How about the

Does that work?

8 the hearing for July 22nd at 2:30.

We'll set

If counsel need more time

9 on their memoranda, I can go back and change those deadlines.
10

MR. RETALLICK:

11 this.
12

I may get mine done sooner than

I've done quite a bit of research on this.
MR. BUNDERSON:

When was the suppression hearing,

13 Your Honor?
14

THE COURT:

July 22nd at 2:30.

We'll leave the same

15 deadlines for the written memoranda.
16

MR. BUNDERSON:

If counsel needs more time, that's

17 fine, just as long as we have a couple of weeks also.
18

THE COURT:

Okay.

The 22nd of July, 2:30 in the

19 afternoon.
20
21

MR. RETALLICK:

Thank you, Your Honor.

(Hearing concluded.)

22
23
24
25
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Pace
1
2

. THE CLERK;

Case number 0211-39, State of Utah

versus Tanja Rynhart.

3

THE COURT:

This is the time scheduled for a hearing

4

on the defendant's motion to suppress.

5

the motion as well as the response.

6

hearing.

I've reviewed briefly

This is the evidentiary

Are counsel ready to proceed?

7

MR. RETALLICK:

Yes, Your Honor.

8

MR. BUNDERSON:

We are.

9

THE COURT:

10

Go ahead, Mr. Bunderson.

MR. BUNDERSON:

Your Honor, I'm prepared to call

11

Officer Burnham to the stand.

He testified at some length in

12

the preliminary hearing.

13

court, he's here and we can refresh the court's recollection

14

of what he has to say today.

15

THE COURT:

If it would be useful for the

I recall, just in general, the facts

16

from the preliminary hearihg after reviewing the memoranda,

17

but you maybe better address the things you think are

18

relevant to the search.

19

MR. RETALLICK:

I wonder if we can do that by

MR. BUNDERSON:

We may be able to.

20

.,

proffer?

21

Let me try this.

22

Someone called in, and it was not the landowner of the

23

property.

24

road.

25

a curve.

Someone called in and said there's a car off the

This was on West Forest Street, if I recall right, at
There's an S curve there at the intersection of
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1

1200 West and Watery Lane.

2

there, having obviously failed to negotiate the curve.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. BUNDERSON:

The vehicle was off in a field

Had it gone through a fence?
It went through two fences and

5

destroyed them.

6

officer was able to determine that the accident happened

7 I about 3:00 a.m.

Because of the timing of the snow fall, the

He got there about 8:30.

8

someone first called it in.

9

the vehicle removed.

10

That's when

The owner of the property wanted

It was ultimately towed away.

Officer Burnham approached the vehicle, found no one in

11

the vicinity.

12

it.

He looked into the vehicle to see what was in

He testified that he was looking for who was there,

13 maybe someone was in the vehicle injured.

Maybe some

14

evidence of who was driving it.

15

opened it and that's where the drugs were found.

16

He found a purse there and

He didnft do a formal inventory, but he did retrieve

17 property from the vehicle and took it into evidence before
18

the vehicle was towed away.

19 morning, if I recall right.

And it was towed away later that
He made attempts to contact Ms.

20

Rynhart and finally did locate her and she made some

21

admissions after he located her.

22

We think this is basically an abandoned property issue or

23

perhaps an exigent circumstances issue.

We don't have a

24

brief filed yet.

25

just wait until we had this hearing before we did that.

Their's was a bit late and we thought we'd
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1

That's basically what we think would be added to the facts

2

that they have already given the court.

3

there's any problem with what' I've said.

4

MR. RETALLICK:

I don't know if

The only exception I take to that is

5

in the officer's report it says since the owner of the

6

vehicle could not be located I had Brett's Towing remove the

7

vehicle from the marsh.

8

a specific request by the property owner.

9

were the case, Your Honor, 41-6-116.10 refers to abandoned

There's no indication that there was

.10 I vehicles in the state of Utah.

But even if that

It defines an abandoned

11

vehicle as any vehicle left unattended on a highway for a

12

period in excess of 48 hours, or on any public or private

13

property for a period in excess of seven days without express

14

or implied consent of the owner, or person in lawful

15

possession or control of the property.

16

So technically, under the statutes and the laws of the

17

state of Utah, this vehicle could not be considered abandoned

18

since it was not on private property in excess of seven days.

19

So it has to be longer -- it has to be there more than seven

20

days.

21

It's very similar to the situation, Your Honor, where if

22

somebody parks in our parking lot behind our building and

23

leave their vehicle there for a couple of days, if we want

24

the vehicle towed we take the responsibility.

25

the police officer and have them come over and have them tow
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1

the vehicle.

2

company to tow it.

3

up paying for that depends on the situation of the vehicle.

4

But we would have to be responsible for that, just the same

5

way as this property owner would have to be.

6

We take responsibility by retaining a towing

THE COURT:

And the ultimate decision as to who ends

Let me ask you, that appears to be

7

consistent with the statute you're reciting, but I'm having a

8

little trouble reconciling that.

9

the city instead of out on West Forest.

10

The vehicle jumps

the curb, tears up the front lawn and smacks into the house.

11

MR. RETALLICK:

12

THE COURT:

13

Let's say this occurs in

Well, Your Honor

—

Does the property owner have to assume

the responsibility for that towing under those circumstances?

14

MR. RETALLICK:

15

to the statute.

16

vehicle theory.

I believe so, Your Honor, according

Well, if you're going under an abandoned

17

THE COURT:

Okay.

18

MR. RETALLICK:

I see.

All right.

But even, Your Honor, let's assume

19

that the officer -- I'm going to cut the officer some slack

20

here.

21

the vehicle, I think as part of his care taking functions he

22

does have the obligation to check the vehicle.

23

that when I was a deputy.

24

the snow and everything and we would go and check the vehicle

25

to make sure there's no one injured inside the vehicle.

To the point where he actually goes and looks inside

I used to do

You see a vehicle off the road in
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1

we would mark the vehicle so that other officers would knew

2

it has been checked.

3

He does have the responsibility to look inside and make

4

sure there's no one in there.

But he exceeded his authority

5

by going forward and searching personal property within a

6

vehicle, which still does have the reasonable expectation of

7 I privacy, although to a lesser extent than a home.

But there

8 1 is still the constitutional protections there, Your Honor.
9
10

In order to determine who owned the vehicle he simply could
have run the license plates.

He didn't have to rummage

111 through personal belongings, especially someone's purse.
12

If he was concerned about the property being unsecured,

13 1 you lock the doors and leave the vehicle.

There were a lot

14

of other less intrusive methods to do what he was trying to

15

accomplish.

16

As far as doing an impound, the officer admitted during

17

his preliminary hearing testimony that this was not an

18

impound.

19

that he admitted that.

He was not impounding.

Quite frankly, I was glad

I had previously gotten from the

20 1 Brigham City police department copies of their impound forms,
21

the documents that he would have had to do and the procedures

22

he would have had to follow if they were trying to claim this

23 I under the impound.
24
25

I didn't even go into that because he

admitted on the stand that this was not an impound.
As good as his intentions were, I think he exceeded the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

scope of his authority in this case.

2

MR. BUNDERSON:

And we think not.

We think that

3 under this circumstance merely checking on the license plate
4 wouldn't tell you who was driving the car necessarily.

And

5

secondly, I believe he did testify that he used that method

6

and did try and find someone and couldn't find anyone to

7 begin with.
8
9

Maybe I'm wrong about that.

Checking the license plate and seeing if the owner could
be contacted?

Okay.

That was tried.

10 owner wanted the vehicle removed.
11 property.

The private property

There was damage to the

Those fences had to be rebuilt.

12

THE COURT:

I don't know if that came in anywhere.

13

MR. BUNDERSON:

That part didn't, but certainly that

14 can be assumed.
15

MR. RETALLICK:

16 Your Honor.
17

No, I don't think it can be assumed,

It's not in the officer's report.

MR. BUNDERSON:

If you want testimony that the

18 property owner wanted it removed, we can certainly add that.
19

THE COURT:

Well, maybe you better have it if you

20 claim that's a fact, because I don't think there was anything
21

about that at the prelim.

22

MR. RETALLICK:

And we would object based on it

23 being hearsay, Your Honor.

We don't have the information.

2.4 I The property owner isn't here.
25

report.

It's not in the police

Typically, if a property owner requests it be
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removed, it would be in there.

And I don't believe thac's ar.

2 issue anyway, Your Honor.
3

THE COURT:

Does the officer claim the property

4 owner contacted him?
5

MR. BUNDERSON:

You called the property owner and

6 what did he say?
7

OFFICER BURNHAM:

8

MR. BUNDERSON:

He wanted the vehicle out.
It's that simple.

He called the

9 property owner and the property owner said I want the vehicle
10 out.
11

THE COURT:

I don't know whether that's going to be

12 determinative or not, but maybe we better get a record on it
13 so we don't get hung up later on those issues.
14
15

MR. RETALLICK:

I'd stipulate to that, Your Honor.

I have no reason to doubt that the officer contacted the

16 property owner and the owner said he wanted it removed.
17

THE COURT:

Let's tie down the time sequence.

When

18 was that in relation to everything else?
19

OFFICER BURNHAM:

Ten minutes after I left I called

20 him.
21

THE COURT:

22

MR. BUNDERSON:

Ten minutes after what?
About 8:45, approximately.

Ten

23 minutes after the officer arrived.
24

THE COURT:

So before the vehicle was towed and

25 before the search of the purse?
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1
2

MR. BUNDERSON:
obviously.

3
4

MR. RETALLICK:

Was it before the search?

Do you

recall that, officer?

5

MR. BUNDERSON:

6

He's looking at his notes.

(Pause in the proceedings.)

7
8

It was before the vehicle was towed

OFFICER BURNHAM:

The property owner arrived and I

had the purse in my hand when he drove up.

9

MR. BUNDERSON:

So you called him?

10

MR. RETALLICK:

I'm sorry, what was that?

11

MR. BUNDERSON:

I'm lost.

12 1 right.

Let me see if I've got it

You called the property owner about ten minutes after

13 I you arrived?
14

OFFICER BURNHAM:

15

MR. RETALLICK:

16

Yes.
Your Honor, maybe we ought to put

the officer on the stand concerning this.

17

THE COURT:

Yes.

Let's do that and then we'll have

18 1 it done the first time.
19

ROBERT BURNHAM,

20

being first duly sworn, was examined and .

21

testified as follows:

22

DIRECT EXAMINATION

23 BY MR. BUNDERSON:
24

Q.

This is just some supplemental testimony to your

25

preliminary hearing testimony and your police report.
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As I

1 understand it, you arrived approximately at 8:30 and found
2

this vehicle in the field, is that correct?

3 A. Yes.
4 Q.

And at some point, approximately ten minutes after that,

5 you called the property owner, do I understand that
6

correctly?

7A.

I had dispatch contact the property owner, yes.

8 Q.

Did you actually talk to the property owner over either a

9

radio or telephone?

10 A.

No.

11 Q.

Did you have some contact with the property owner?

And

12 if so when and how?
13 J A.

He arrived on the scene just within a few minutes. He

14 doesn't live very far away.

He arrived and we had a

15 conversation at that point.
16 Q.

And he said what?

17 A.

He said that he wanted the vehicle to be removed.

18 Q.

Now, at some point you had picked up the purse out of the

19 I car, is that correct?
20 A.

Yes.

21 Q.

And the car was unlocked?

You didn't have to break into

22 it in any way?
23 A.

That's correct.

24 Q.

You recall holding the purse in your hand while talking

25 to the property owner?
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1 A.

It was in my hand or on the trunk of my car.

I had

2

recovered it at that time.

3

Q.

Do you recall if you had opened it at that time?

•4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

So you had found the drugs before the property owner got

6

there?

7

A.

Yes.

8

MR. BUNDERSON:

9

Thank you.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. RETALLICK:
11 Q.
12

Officer, the property owner is the sheriff, isn't that

correct?

13 A.

Yes, it is.

14 Q.

And you would assume the sheriff would have personal

15

knowledge of the statute that I cited concerning abandoned

16

property?

17

MR. BUNDERSON:

Well, I'll object.

18

MR. RETALLICK:

I'll strike it.

19 Q.
20

(BY MR. RETALLICK)

Now, did you do a complete inventory

of all items in the vehicle?

21 A.

No.

22

Q.

All right.

23

liability situation.

24

said, officer, there was $10,000 worth of jewelry in this

25

vehicle and it's now missing.

So basically .-- let's think of this in a
Let's suppose someone came to you and

Who is. going to be responsible
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1 or who would you anticipate being liable in that situation
2 because -- did you do any kind of inventory to ensure or
3 J protect against your liability?
4 A.

You're calling it an inventory.

5 entire vehicle for any valuables.
6 what was contained in the purse:
7

I did look through the

The only thing I found was
Some cash and the other

items mentioned.

8 Q.

But you didn't put it down --

9 A.

I didn't write anything down.

10 Q. ' Okay.
11 A.

I did look through the vehicle.

12 1 I looked under the seats.
13 1 in the vehicle.

I opened all the doors.

There was quite a number of items

I was primarily concerned with, as you

14 mentioned, jewelry or money.
15 Q.

Okay.

So you did a very thorough search of this vehicle,

16 looking under the seats and so on?
17 A.

(Witness nodded his head.)

18 Q.

You were looking for contraband?

19 A.

If I'd have found it I would have taken it, yes.

20

THE COURT:

One question I have.

Remind me of what

21 type of vehicle this was?
22

THE WITNESS:

23

THE COURT:, Any other questions?

24
25

A mini van.

REDIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. BUNDERSON:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 13
1

Q.

You did see several items when you were looking through

2

the vehicle?

3 A.

Yes, I did.

4

You made a record of those?

Q.

5 A.

Yes, I did.

6

Q.

You passed over and left in the vehicle items that didn't

7

appear to have any particular value, as I understand it?

8

A.

Yes.

9

Q.

And retrieved items that obviously had value, such as the

10 purse, cash in the purse?
11 A.

Yes.

12 Q.

Was there a briefcase you also took?

13 A.

There was a briefcase, but I don't remember -- Ifd have

14

to look at my notes.

I don't remember if I took it or not.

15

It was listed in my report, but I don't remember if I took

16 it.
17 Q.

All right.

Do you recall approximately what time the

18 vehicle was towed, do you have that in your records?
19 A.

I have a note here in my radio log at 9:35 something to

20

do with the wrecker, but I don't know if that's when --

21

that's just a note that dispatch put in.

I think they were

22 I being summoned to another call.
23

Q.

24

towing occurred at about that time, 9:35?

25 A.

Would it be consistent with your recollection that the

I was on the scene until 10:00.

The vehicle was towed
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1

prior to me leaving the scene.

2

Q.

Okay.

3

A.

In fact, it would have been just a few minutes -- there

4

would have been no reason for me to stay after the vehicle

5

was removed.

6

Q.

7

Do you recall if there were any livestock, animals, in the

8

field?

9

A.

10

Okay.

This is something that you may not have a note on,

There is some times.

They keep cattle in there, but I

believe they winter them somewhere else.

11

MR. BUNDERSON:

12

THE COURT:

13

MR. RETALLICK:

14

That's all I have.

Anything further, Mr. Retallick?
Yes.

RECROSS-EXAMINATION

15

BY MR. RETALLICK:

16

Q.

17

impound?

18

A.

Not that I'm aware of, unless it's a DUI.

19

Q.

There's no mandatory impound if you find controlled

20

substances in a vehicle?

21

A.

Does your department have a policy concerning mandatory

No, I don't believe so.

22

MR. RETALLICK:

Okay.

23

MR. BUNDERSON:

I haven't anything further.

24

THE COURT:

25

Nothing further, Your Honor.

You may step down.

Mr. Bunderson, how

much time do you need to get your response in?
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MR. BUNDERSON:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. RETALLICK:

4

THE COURT:

5
6

A couple of weeks, Your Honor.

Any objection to that, Mr. Retallick?
No, Your Honor.

All right.

I'll give the state until

August 5th at five to have their reply in.
MR. RETALLICK:

Your Honor, I should be able to

7 J review their reply and let the court know whether there is
any rebuttal necessary.
91
10

THE COURT:

Let me ask you to do this.

review the reply and either submit a rebuttal or just file a

111 little paper that says notice to submit.
12

MR. RETALLICK:

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. BUNDERSON:

16

THE COURT:

18 I

One or the other,

so that the matter gets reviewed,

13

17

If you'll

Thank you, Your Honor.

Anything else?
No.

We'll take a short recess and then take

the last case,
(Hearing concluded.)

19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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C E R T I F I C A T E

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the videotaped hearing was
transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a Certified Court
Reporter and Certified Court Tape Transcriber in and for
the State of Utah, residing at Brigham City, Utah.
That a full, true and correct transcription of the
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the
pages numbered 2 to 15, inclusive.
I further certify that the original transcript was
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Box Elder
County, Brigham City, Utah.
I also certify that I am not associated with any
of the parties to said matter and that I am not interested
in the event thereof.
Witness my hand this 26th day of November, 2002.

\*

r•r
Rodney M. Felshaw, C.S.R., R.P.R.
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Addendum C.

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BOX ELDER

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Case No. 021100039 FS

Plaintiff,
vs.
TANJARYNHART,
11680 North Rocky Point Rd.
Bothwell, UT 84337
DOB: 02/25/66

HON. BEN H. HADFIELD

Defendant.

This matter comes before the court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant
seeks to suppress evidence found in her purse when an officer searched it onfindingit in her
vehicle. On 6 January 2002 a property owner who happens to be the Box Elder County Sheriff
called officer Burnham about a vehicle that had jumped the curb, crashed through two fences
and came to rest offthe road in a marsh. Upon investigating, Officer Burnham discovered that
the vehicle had been there at leastfiveor six hours and that the driver was not anywhere near
the vehicle. Officer Burnham searched the vehicle and the purse in an effort to determine who
the driver was.
The Defendant frames the issue as whether the officer conducted a proper search
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

incident to "impounding" the vehicle. The State has couched the issues as whether the vehicle
was "abandoned" or whether, if not, the officer's search was valid because he was functioning
in his "community caretaker" role.
The court agrees with the Defendant that the officer did not properly impound the
vehicle so that he could not use that as a basis to justify the search. He completed no inventory.
He apparently did not officially impound the vehicle. The State, however, does not rely on the
impoundment to justify the search.
The court does not believe that a warrant is required to search an abandoned vehicle
as the expectation of privacy in such a vehicle is greatly lessened. Nor does the court believe
that the presumption of abandonment set forth in Utah Code Ann §41-6-116.10 is coextensive
with the concept of "abandonment" for purposes of the fourth amendment analysis. Rather,
abandonment for determining the expectation of privacy must be determinedfromthe facts of
the specific case which may involve the section 116.10(4) criteria or additional factors such as
leaving the vehicle at the scene of an accident as was done here. See State v. Anderson, 1996
S.D. 59, 548 N.W.2d 40 (1996). The Utah Court of Appeals has summarized the applicable
law in another context:
Whether defendant had abandoned her purse, under search and seizure
analysis, is primarily a factual question of intent to voluntarily
relinquish a reasonable expectation of privacy, which may be inferred
from "words spoken, acts done, and other objective facts." Thomas,
864 F.2d at 846 (quoting United States v. Colbert, 474 F.2d 174, 176
(5th Cir. 1973)). See also Gurgel v. Nichol, 19 Utah 2d 200, 429 P.2d
47,48 (1967) (abandonment ordinarily a question for the factfinder to
2
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be determinedfromthe facts and circumstances). The burden of
proving abandonment falls on the state, People v. Contreras, 210 Cal.
App. 3d 450,259 Cal. Rptr. 290,293 (1989), and must be shown by
"clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence." Friedman v. United States,
347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Boswell,
347 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1975); O'Shaughnessy v. State, 420 So. 2d
377, 379 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). It "is measuredfromthe vantage
point" of the defendant, [** 19] and not the police. Narain v. State, 79
Md. App. 385, 556 A.2d 1158, 1161 n.4 (1989). "It is only the
[defendant's] state of mind that counts." Id.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730, (Utah Ct. App. 1991) rev 'd on other grounds State v. Rowe, 850
P.2d 427 (Utah 1992). Applying the standards set forth in Rowe, the court must conclude that
the State has failed to carry its burden to show abandonment. The officer inspected the vehicle
at 8:30 in the morning and determined that it had been in the marsh since at least 3:00 a.m. that
morning. The owner or driver would not have had time to make arrangements to retrieve the
vehicle if it was damaged. The State failed to present any evidence of the state of the vehicle.
If the vehicle could be driven, then the officer may have been more justified in believing that
it had been abandoned. Although there clearly had been an accident, it appears that no other
vehicles were involved. The apparent early hour, the winter conditions, and the single vehicle
nature of the accident all combine to belie the officer's imputing an intent to abandon the
vehicle.
The court does find, however, that the community caretaker function of the officer
was properly invoked here. The accident occurred around 3:00 a.m. on a cold January night.
The absence of the driver made it imperative that the officer identify the driver so that he or she
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I

could be found. The driver could have been in distress and lost or disoriented. The officer
acted appropriately in attempting to determine who was the driver. Although the Defendant
makes a good point that the owner of the vehicle could be ascertained by using the license plate
number, the owner and the driver are not necessarily the same person, and the officer had a duty
to ascertain the facts in order to preserve life in the event the driver had wandered off and was
lost. As such, all three prongs of the Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12 994 P.2d
1283 (2000) test are satisfied. (1) The officer had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that
an emergency existed - a vehicle involved in an accident in the early morning hours that had
been left by its driver.

(2) The officer testified that the search was for the purpose of

ascertaining who was the driver so that the motivation was not primarily to arrest or seize
evidence, and (3) it was reasonable to search the purse in connection with the emergency.
The motion to suppress is denied. Counsel for the State shall prepare an order in
conformance with this decision.

Dated this

OI

day of

»2 0 ^ - i

b \

By the court

Judge Ben H. Hadfield
District Judge
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I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 021100039 by the method and on the date
specified.
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NAME
JON J. BUNDERSON
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